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This research paper studies the impact of multiple listings of covered warrants 
in the Hong Kong stock market. The issue of warrants has gained significant growth 
since 1987 and covered warrants, in particular, has grew rapidly in 1992 and 1993. 
Financial institutions usually choose the 'blue chip' stocks as the underlying asset for 
their covered warrants. 
Impacts of warrant listing on underlying stocks are investigated in terms of 
abnormal returns, systematic risk, total volatility and trading volume. The effect of 
multiple issues is studied through the comparison between impacts of first issue and 
second issue. 
Our research study inicates that the total volatility for first issue has significant 
decrease whereas the systematic risk for second issue experiences significant increase. 
Other items including abnormal return and trading volume show insignificant changes. 
We argue that the results may be fue to the characteristics of covered warrants such as 
the coverage ot the underlying stocks and the activity of dynamic hedging. Moreover, 
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Extensive researches and evidences on the effects of listing of derivatives on 
their underlying assets are given across major stock markets. With the growing global 
integration of the Hong Kong stock market, we wish to provide some insights on the 
issue of the local market. The effect of multiple listing will be studied in this report. 
Information content for listing of derivatives can be inferred from impacts of 
the listing event. It is easy to find that the underlying stocks covered warrant have 
their prices fall immediately after warrant listing. Such phenomenal change triggers the 
proposition that issuance of covered warrants signals the respective stock price is 
appreciated away from its expected price and some short-term correction would be 
followed. It is our purpose to find out such phenomenon has real implication on the 
local stock market. 
This study begins with a brief review of warrants and its market in Hong Kong, 
followed by issue of multiple covered warrant listing in Chapter III. Chapter IV 
'describes the literature review and Chapter V supplies the methodology used to 
investigate the impacts. Empirical results and their discussions are given in Chapter VI 
and VII respectively. Finally, the limitation that we faced, the conclusion and the 






WARRANTS AND WARRANT MARKET 
General Issue of Warrants and Covered Warrants 
Warrant is a financial derivative which gives its holder the right to purchase the 
ordinary shares of a listed company at a pre-determined exercise price in a specific 
period. This exercise price is fixed regardless of the change in the current market price 
of the underlying stock? Two main types of warrants are listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange namely equity warrants and derivative warrants. The former refers to 
those warrants issued by a listed company for its ordinary shares whereas the latter 
refers to those issued by a third party and not by the listed company itself. Covered 
warrant is a special class of the latter which the issuer holds the underlying securities to 
meet its exercise obligation. Most of the covered warrants are issued for blue chip' 
stocks (i.e. constituent stocks of Hang Seng Index). 
Covered warrant resembles the characteristics of a call option which also gives 
the right to its holder to purchase the underlying stock at a striking price. However, 
the number of contracts in a call option is subjected to variation depending on the 
demand and supply condition. On the other hand, the number of shares quoted in a 
1 Terpstra, R. H. Manual of the Hong Kong Securities Industry. The Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, 1994, p. 72. 
% 
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warrant is fixed at the listing date and warrants of the same kind has the same striking 
price. � 
The rationale behind covered warrant issuance is quite confusing. Some 
institutions enjoy the ease of raising capital in the stock market through issuing 
covered warrants. The underlying 'blue chip' stocks give confidence and credit 
worthiness to the investors to buy such financial product. Whenever an institution sees 
any mispricing of the underlying stocks, they can issue the covered warrants to lock in 
profit generated from their current portfolio of stocks. The exercise price is usually 
pegged at a higher price than the share price at the time of issue. Some other 
institutions may try to reform their portfolios composition so as to adjust the risk. 
Other institutions can hedge price fluctuations of the underlying stocks held. 
From the investors' perspective, covered warrants appeal to their holders since 
the downside risk of warrant is protected. However, the leverage effect due to the 
covered warrants can increase the risk as well as the return. 
Hong Kong Warrant Market 
The history of warrant market in Hong Kong can be dated back to 1973 when 
Hong Kong Land issued its own equity warrant. The trading activities were not active 
until the unified stock exchange commenced its services in 1986. Within a period of 
seven years’ the number of warrants issued has gone up by more than ten times. 
Derivative warrant has grown rapidly since 1991 and over 80% of them are 
covered warrants. As at October 1993, the total number of warrants listed on the 
stock exchange amounts to 280. In Table 1，the number of equity warrants and 
t 




NUMBER OF WARRANT ISSUES IN HONG KONG 
Number of Warrant Issues in Hong Kong 
End of Year Number of Equity Number of Derivative Total Number of 
Warrant Issues Warrant Issues Warrant Issues 
“ 1986 26 0 — 26 
1987 78 ~ 0 78 
“ 1988 “ 114 - 2 — 116 
“ 1989 一 113 4 — 117 
1990 — 133 8 m 
1991 151 23 — 174 
“ 1992 一 212 “ 58 — 270 
“ 1993* 213 67 280 
* As at October 1993 
Source: Terpstra, R. H., Manual of the Hong Kong securities industry. The Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 1994, p. 3 76. 
Usually covered warrants are issued in small size. Because financial institutions 
usually do not possess a large quantity of the underlying stocks, the total issue is often 
less than US$20 million in market capitalisation or 1% of the issued shared capital of 
the underlying shares. The lack of liquidity lowers the trading (speculative) value of 
the covered warrant and leads to a lower (time-value) premium. 
Listing of a covered warrant is a long process. First the issuer should meet the 
requirement of holding adequate underlying stock before it can announce the issuance 
at the announcement date. Next, the issuer lists its covered warrant in the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange for trading at the listing date. Finally, the covered warrant will stop 
trading naturally in the Stock Exchange at the expiration date specified in its issuing 
terms and conditions. At that date, the covered warrant should be exercised to buy the 
underlying stock or else it becomes valueless. 
� 5 
Warrants issued in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are actually American style 
instead of European style. American options and European options have the same 
features except the latter can be only exercised at a particular pre-determined date. An 
illustration of the difference between options and warrants is given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF SEHK WARRANTS AND HKFE HSI OPTIONS 
Characteristics of SEHK Warrants and HKFE Options on HSI 
Warrants Options 
American Style European Style 
"Listed on the SEHK 一 Listed on the HKFE 
Number of Warrants fixed at issue Number of options depends upon market 
activity 
Initial maturity 1 to 5 years Initial maturity 1 to 9 months 
Guaranteed by issuer Guaranteed by clearinghouse 
Shorting - selling Short selling allowed 
Exercise price fixed at issue Different strikes available 
Calls only (There is an except when the Puts and calls 
underlying is an index). 
Source : Terpstra, R H., Manual of the Hong Kong securities industry, The Stock 






MULTIPLE COVERED WARRANT LISTING ISSUE 
The effects of multiple listing of covered warrants are not well documented in 
the local market. However, the interest for financial institutions to issue covered 
warrants is well indicated in 1992 and 1993 in the Hong Kong stock market. Special 
concerns have been raised when covered warrants are issued. 
In Hong Kong, multiple listing of covered warrants happened mainly in the 
period 1992 to 1993 which covers a bull market. Multiple listing is most likely to 
happen in the period when the market has gained momentum to grow sharply. 
However, the issue of covered warrant is sometimes perceived to be a signal to 
a short-term market condition - the market has already been over-priced and some 
correction is going to happen. It is evident by the fall of the underlying stock price and 
the market inces after the issue of covered warrant especially when two or more 
covered warrants are announced and issued at the same time. 
The effect for first issue should be more substantial than second or above issue. 
When the market has more financial products such as covered warrants for investors, 
the appetite for them to buy a particular product is lowered. In view of multiple 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Multiple listing of the covered warrants is a special issue and there is no past 
study on this topic. Moreover, there are a few studies on the impacts of covered 
warrants on the underlying stocks since they are not so popular in the world's financial 
markets. However, since covered warrants are similar to call options in terms of the 
right to purchase the underlying stocks in specific prices in specific periods, the 
impacts of covered warrants will be similar to the impacts of the options. 
Theoretical Reviews 
According to the Option Pricing Theory by Black and Scholes (1973), options 
are redundant securities since under a complete market, the payoff on an option can be 
duplicated by a self-financing investment strategy in the stock and the risk-free 
investment. Under this situation with the assumption of non-arbitrage opportunities, 
option listing should have no impact on the underlying stocks. 
However, this theory is based on the assumption of the complete market, which 
is inaccurate representation of the actual financial markets. In the actual incomplete 
markets, the situation is different. Detemple and Selden (1991) develop a general 
equilibrium model of an incomplete financial market. In their model, they find that the 
primary markets (or the stock markets) and the derivative asset markets (such as 
% 
8 
option markets) generically interact, which means that the option listing may have 
impact on the underlying stocks. 
Option listing means that the incomplete financial market becomes more 
complete by expanding the opportunity set to the investors. In Detemple and Selden's 
model, the investors with a high risk assessment have a relative preference for higher 
payoff so they prefer options to stocks. As a result, they sell the stock and buy the 
option to get higher return. On the other hand, the ones with a low risk assessment 
will do reversibly, i.e., buy the stock and sell the option to hedge the risk. Since the 
second class of investors has a stronger reaction to the change in the market structure, 
the demand for the stock increases after option listing and so the stock price increases. 
Moreover, since the less risk-averse investors shift to option markets for higher return, 
the volatility of the stock return decreases and the stock market becomes stablized. 
Beside improving market completeness, option listing can also improve the 
market's informational efficiency. According to Diamond and Verrechia (1987), 
investors with private information cannot get advantage due to higher transaction costs 
of stock trading or the short-sales constraints in the stock market. Under such 
constraints, the prices cannot adjust quickly to negative information and so the market 
is informational inefficient. After introducing options (especially put options), the 
prices can much quickly adjust since the investors can buy or sell the options according 
to the information. As a result, the stock market will become more efficient after 
option listing. 
However, there are also some counter arguments over the introduction of 
options. Stein (1987, 1989) argues that there are informational externalities of trading 
in derivative assets, which cause a change in the information content of the price of the 
I 
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underlying stock. In his model, an introduction of a high risk, high return derivative 
can lead to speculation. The speculators with inferior information can affect the 
information content of the prices of the underlying stocks adversely and so the market 
becomes more volatile and unstable. However, the empirical studies on the option 
listing support the model of Detemple and Selden (1991) rather than Stein's one. 
Empirical Studies 
Most of the empirical studies on the impacts of option and warrant 
introductions focus on the impact on excess return, return volatility, systematic risk 
(beta), and trading volume. In general, they provide similar results. The results are 
summarized in the Table 3 and Table 4. 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON WARRANT LISTING 
Study on Sample Sample 
Warrant listing Papers Size Period Result 
Excess return Cheung, Ho, Lim, and Yau (1993) 49 1 9 8 9 - 9 3 n o change 
Lui and Szeto (1994) 38 1990-92 negative 
Total volatility Cheung, Ho, Lim, and Yau (1993) 49 1989-93 decrease 
Lui and Szeto (1994) 38 1990-92 decrease 
Systematic risk Cheung, Ho, Lim, and Yau (1993) 49 1989-93 no change 
Lui and Szeto (1994) 38 1990-92 no change 





SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON OPTION LISTING 
Study on Sample Sample 
Option listing Papers Size Period Result 
Excess return Branch and Finnerty (1981) 222 1973-77 positive 
Cornad (1989) 96 1973-80 positive 
DeTemple and Jorion (1990) 322 1973-86 positive 
Haddad and Voorheis (1991) 327 1973-86 positive 
Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) 39 1978-89 positive 
Total volatility Hayes and Tennenbaum (1979) 43 1972-77 decrease 
Whiteside, Duke and Dunne (1983) 71 1973-81 decrease 
Ma & Rao (1986, 1988) 251 1972-83 decrease 
Skinner (1988) 304 1973-86 decrease 
Bansal, Pruitt and Wei (1989) 175 1973-86 decrease 
Conrad (1989) 96 1973-80 decrease 
Nabar and Park (1989) 494 1973-85 decrease 
Damodaran and Lim (1991) 200 1973-86 decrease 
DeTemple and Jorion (1990) 322 1973-86 decrease 
Haddad and Voorheis (1991) 327 1973-86 decrease 
Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) 39 1978-89 decrease 
Systematic risk Trennepohl and Dukes (1979) 32 1970-76 decrease 
Klmekosky and Maness (1980) 40 1972-79 decrease 
Skinner (1988) 304 1973-86 no change 
Bansal, Pruitt and Wei (1989) 175 1973-86 no change 
Conrad (1989) 96 1973-80 no change 
Damodaran and Lim (1991) 200 1973-86 no change 
Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) 39 1978-89 no change 
Trading volume Hayes and Tennenbaum (1979) 43 1973 -77 increase 
(raw volume) 
Branch and Finnerty (1981) 222 1973-77 increase 
(market-adjusted) 
Whiteside, Duke and Dunne (1983) 71 1973-81 no change 
‘ Skinner (1988) 304 1973-86 increase 
(raw volume) 
Bansal, Pruitt and Wei (1989) 175 1973-86 increase 
(market-adjusted) 




Source: Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992) and other papers 
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There are very few empirical studies on the impacts of covered warrants in 
Hong Kong. Cheung, Ho, Lim, and Yau (1993) look at the impact of introducing 
derivative warrants on the underlying securities in Hong Kong. In their study, 25 
derivative warrants are investigated and 7 of which are covered warrants. The result 
shows that there is no significant change in return around the introduction of covered 
warrants. Moreover, there is significant decrease in total volatility around their 
introduction days. Also, the change of systematic risk before and after warrant listing 
is insignificant. 
Lui and Szeto (1994) also carry out a study on the impact of warrant listing. 
This study shows similar results as Cheung, Ho, Lim, and Yau's (1993) study except 
the excess return. Lui and Szeto (1994) find out that there is negative abnormal return 
after warrant listing which contrasts with the empirical studies of the impact of options 
(which will be discussed below). They argue that the negative abnormal return is due 
to the dilution effect and the negative information effect of the warrant listing. 
Moreover, they also find out that the trading volume decreases after warrant listing 
and it is due to the demand shifts from stocks to warrants. 
For the impact on the call option listing, there are many empirical studies on 
this topic. Branch and Finnerty (1981), Conrad (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), 
Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992), and Haddad and Voorheis (1991) all find out that 
there are positive excess returns on the underlying stocks around the listing days. This 
shows that the option introduction is welcome by the investors and thus the event of 
* 
introduction is treated as a good news. 
The studies on the volatility of the underlying stocks after option listing are 
consistent to the Detemple and Selden's (1991) model. Hayes and Tennenbaum 
t 
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(1979), Whiteside, Duke and Dunne (1983), Ma & Rao (1986, 1988), Skinner (1988), 
Bansal, Pruitt and Wei (1989), Conrad (1989), Nabar and Park (1989), Damodaran 
and Lim (1991)，DeTemple and Jorion (1990), Haddad and Voorheis (1991), and 
Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) all show that after option listing, the total volatility of 
the return of the underlying stock decreases. 
Besides total volatility, there are empirical studies on the systematic risk (beta). 
Trennepohl and Dukes (1979), and Klmekosky and Maness (1980) find out that beta 
decreases after option listing. However, Skinner (1988), Bansal, Pruitt and Wei 
(1989), Conrad (1989), Damodaran and Lim (1991), Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) 
show that the systematic risk does not change. 
There are some empirical studies on the impact of trading volume. Hayes and 
Tennenbaum (1979), Branch and Finnerty (1981), Skinner (1988), Bansal, Pruitt and 
Wei (1989), Damodaran and Lim (1991) find out that the trading volume increases 
after option listing which shows that the liquidity increases by introducing options. 
However, Damodaran and Lim (1991) argue that after adjusting the trading volume 





We will study the impacts of covered warrants on the underlying stocks in 
Hong Kong around event dates of listing. Particularly, we will look at the difference in 
impacts when the covered warrants with the same underlying stocks are listed more 
than one time. In this Chapter, we will describe the analysis methods and the data 
selection criteria used in this paper. 
Data Selection 
Our study period is from January 1989 to December 1992. In this period, there 
are totally 49 covered warrants listed in the Stock Exchange Hong Kong. All of the 
underlying stocks for these covered warrants are "blue-chip" stocks. The complete list 
of these covered warrants is stated in Appendix 1. 
Our select criteria are as follows: 
i) Only covered warrants which are issued at least twice on the same 
underlying stocks in the specified period are chosen. Since our focus of 
study is on the effect of multiple issuance of the covered warrants, only 
those with at least two listings are selected. 
ii) Multiple warrant listing with overlapping event windows are excluded 
in the sample. The event window will be a period of 65 trading days. 
We define the warrant listing date as Day 0. The period from Day -32 
t 
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to Day -3 is called pre-listing period and that from Day +3 to Day +32 
is called post-listing period. The period from Day -2 to Day +2 
(including the listing date Day 0) is excluded in the analysis to reduce 
any estimation bias to the parameters due to the possible effects 
associated with the actual listing. We set a small event window since 
we want to ensure that there are enough sample data for analysis, and 
thus the event window cannot be set too large so that most of the 
covered warrants with multiple listing can be retained in our sample set. 
iii) Warrants with event windows exceeding the period of the study will be 
excluded. This means that warrants which event windows are before 1 
January 1989 or after 31 December 1992 will not be included in the 
sample. 
iv) Only first two listings of the covered warrants will be focused in the 
study since there are few warrants with more than two listings. 
Under these criteria, 9 pairs of covered warrants (i.e., 18 covered warrants) are 
selected as the sample set of our study. The sample set is listed in Appendix 2. 
Analysis Method 
For each event, we will compare the impact of multiple warrant listing on the 
underlying stocks in four different areas: 
1) abnormal return, 
2) total volatility, 
3) systematic risk (P)，and 






To find out if there is any effect on the above areas due to (multiple) warrant 
listing, both parametric (t-statistic) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon Matched-pairs 
Signed-ranks test?) tests are used. 
Abnormal Return 
To study the effect on return of the underlying stocks, Jensen's measure of 
abnormal performance is used: 
(Rit - Rft) = oci + pi(Rmt - Rft) + eit (1) 
where t = day in the event window (-32 ... -3, +3 ... + 32) 
Rit = returns on security i for period t 
= In (P,t/Pi(t-i))； or 
In ((Pit + Dit) / Pi(t-i)) if dividend is paid out at time t 
where Ph = closing price of security t for period t 
Rft = risk-free rate (1 -month HIBOR) 
Rmt = the market return for period t 
= In (HSIt / HSI(t.i)) 
where HSIt = closing index of Hang Seng Index for 
period t 
oci = Jensen's performance measure 
Pi = beta of security i 
eu 二 a random error term. 
Regression is used to find out the coefficients a\ and pi of the equation for each 
underlying stock i in the pre- and post-listing periods. The difference in the Jensen's 
measures (i.e., oci) before and after warrant listing is measured to see whether the 
difference is significant. Moreover, we will compare the change in Jensen's measures 
in first and second listings to see if there is any significant difference. 
2 Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test is a standard non-parametric test 
which measures whether two samples are significantly different by finding number of 
cases in first sample that is greater (or less) than those in second sample. 
. 16 
Total Volatility 
The total volatility of the return of stock i is measured in terms of variance of 
its deflated returns R,. 
VarOV") = Var [(Rit - Rft) / (R„,t - Rfi)] (2) 
The variance of the deflated returns of stock i across the event window is 
calculated and the variances in the pre- and post-listing periods are compared to see if 
the difference is significant. Similar to the analysis of underlying stock return, we also 
compare the change in total volatility in the first and second listings to see if the 
difference is significant or not. 
Systematic Risk 
To measure the systematic risk, the beta coefficient (pi) in equation (1) is used. 
Since the beta coefficient measures the systematic risk of a security relative to the 
market, we can compare the beta coefficients of the underlying securities in the pre-
and post-listing periods to see whether there is any significant difference. Again, the 
change in beta in two different listings is compared. 
Trading Volume 
Change in trading volume in response to the events are assessed by calculating 
the mean volume ratio {MVR) for all underlying securities. First of all, the total trading 
volume of an underlying security i in the pre- and post-listing periods are calculated by: 




Then, the trading volume ratio (VRj) for security i is calculated: 
m ； ( / T K J X (TV^, / � (4) 
where 7¥爪山 and are the total market volumes in the pre- and post-listing periods. 
After finding out VRj, we can calculate the cross-sectional mean volume ratio 
for all N firms by: 
N 
MVR = \/ N.Y/Ri (5) 
Z = 1 
To see whether there is any significant change in trading volume around the 
event day, we can compare MVR with the no-change value of 1.0. ]f MVR is greater 
than 1, then the trading volume of the underlying stock increases for warrant listing; if 
MVR is less than 1, then trading volume decreases for warrant listing. 
If MVR is significantly different from 1.0, we can say that there is an effect on 
the trading volume of the underlying securities around the listing day. Moreover, the 









PARAMETRIC TEST ON ABNORMAL RETURN OF WARRANT ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
Before After ~ Before After 
Mean abnormal returns (aj) 0.000956 6.2E-06 -0.00018 -0.00026 
Variance 3.91E-06 1.01E-Q5 4.57E-Q6 5.88E-Q6 
t Statistic 0.628982 0.067439 
P(T<-t) one-tail 0.273448 0.473944 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.859548 1.859548 
p(T<=t) two-tail 0.546897 0.947887 
t Critical value two-tail (95%) 2.306006 2.306006 
TABLE 6 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON ABNORMAL RETURN OF WARRANT ISSUES 
(ai) First Issue Second Issue 
Number of cases (Before < After) 4 4 
Number of cases (Before > After) 5 5 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z = -0.7701 -0.0592 
2-Tailed Probability 0-4413 0.9528 
The results of t-test and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test are 
shown in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively. Both tests indicate that it is unlikely to 
have significant change in abnormal return in the periods before and after the listing of 
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covered warrants. Although results from both tests are not statistically significant, 
they are consistent in the sense that the significance levels for first issue are higher that 
than of second issue which may indicate that the effect of covered warrant listing on 
the abnormal return reduces in the second issue. 
TABLE 7 
PARAMETRIC TEST ON ABNORMAL RETURN OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in (gj) (After minus Before) First Issue Second Issue 
Mean difference -0.00095 -7.6E-05 
Variance 2.05E-05 1.15E-05 
t Statistic -0.4633 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.324899 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.753051 
p(T<=t) two-tail 0.649798 
t Critical value two-tail (95%) 2.131451 
TABLE 8 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON ABNORMAL RETURN OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in (ocj) (After minus Before) Result 
Number of cases First issue < Second Issue 6 
Number of cases First issue > Second Issue 3 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z = -.8885 
2-Tailed Probability 0.3743 
A closer look to the effect of multiple listing is illustrated in Table 7 in which 
parametric test is run on the difference of abnormal return (i.e., abnormal return after 
listing minus abnormal return before listing). In Table 8, the difference of abnormal 
return is tested under the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test and again no 






PARAMETRIC TEST ON SYSTEMATIC RISK OF WARRANT ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
Before After Before After 
Mean systematic risk (pi) 1.065573 1.250322 0.875607 1.089704 
Variance 0.060798 0.097123 0.045703 0.040425 
t Statistic -1.32711 -1.85493 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.110548 0.050356 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.859548 1.859548 
p(T<=t) two-tail 0.221096 0.100712 
t Critical value two-tail (95%) 2.306006 2.306006 
TABLE 10 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON SYSTEMATIC RISK OF WARRANT ISSUES 
(Pj) First Issue Second Issue 
Number of cases (Before < After) 5 6 
Number of cases (Before > After) 4 3 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z = -1.2439 Z = -1.5993 
2-Tailed Probability 0.2135 0.1097 
TABLE 11 
PARAMETRIC TEST ON SYSTEMATIC RISK OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in (pQCAfter minus Before) First Issue Second Issue 
Mean difference 0.184749 0.214096 
Variance 0.174418 0.119896 
t Statistic -0.16229 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.436623 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.753051 
p(T<=t) two-tail • 0.873247 




NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON SYSTEMATIC RISK OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in (pi)(After minus Before) Result 
Number of cases First issue < Second Issue 5 
Number of cases First issue > Second Issue 4 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z = -0.0592 
2-Tailed Probability 0 .9528 
The tests on systematic risk have more significant results than on abnormal 
return. Table 9 and Table 10 show the results. Both t-test and Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test indicate that there is no statistically significant change in 
systematic risk in the first issue. However, they do indicate the likelihood that 
systematic risk increases after the second listing. The confidence level for the 
likelihood of increase is 95% for one-tail (in t-test) and 90% for two-tail (in both 
tests). For the multiple listing effects. Table 11 and Table 12 indicate that the effects 
of first and second issues are insignificantly different from each other. 
Total Volatility 
The total volatility is taken from the variance of deflated return rA A plot of 
the average deflated return across the event window is shown in Figure 1. Sharp rises 
and falls are observed before listing though peaks occur at day -27 and -13 































































































































































































































































































































PARAMETRIC TEST ON TOTAL VOLATILITY OF WARRANT ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
Before After Before After 
Mean total volatility Var(Ri^) 1090.745 36.22549 1285.936 24.73394 
Variance 6159970 656.7993 13682744 207.4578 
t Statistic 1.281425 1.022088 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.117968 0.168325 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.859548 1.859548 
p(T<=t) two-tail 0.235936 0.336649 
. t Critical value two-tail (95%) 2.306006 2.306006 
TABLE 14 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON TOTAL VOLATILITY OF WARRANT ISSUES 
Var(Rid) First Issue Second Issue 
Number of cases (Before < After) 2 5 
Number of cases (Before > After) 1 4 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z = -1.9548 Z = -.1777 
2-Tailed Probability 0.0506 0.8590 
TABLE 15 
PARAMETRIC TEST ON TOTAL VOLATILITY OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in Var(Ri'') (After minus Before) First Issue Second Issue 
Mean difference -1054.52 -1261.2 
Variance 6094883 13703610 
t Statistic 0.139351 
P(T<=t) one-tail � 0.445579 
t Critical value one-tail (95%) 1.761309 
p(T<=t) two-tail 0.891158 




NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON TOTAL VOLATILITY OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Difference in VarCRj"^ ) (After minus Before) Result 
Number of cases First issue < Second Issue 5 
Number of cases First issue > Second Issue 4 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test Z 二 -0.5331 
2-Tailed Probability 0 .5940 
The results of the empirical tests on the covered warrant listing are shown in 
Table 13 and Table 14. The parametric test does not show any significant change in 
the total volatility but the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test indicates a 
significant decrease in total volatility after the first issue. The inconsistency in two 
tests may arise from the averaging effect. Again Table 15 and Table 16 show the result 
for tests between first and second listing of covered warrants and no significant result 
can be concluded. 
Trading Volume 
Figure 2 in the next page shows the average raw trading volume of the sample 
set during the event window at the first and the second issues. From this figure, we 
can see that there is no significant increase or decrease in trading volume after warrant 
listing. Moreover, after comparing the trading volume in two listing issues, we find that 
there is no significant difference in terms of increase or decrease. 
One may note that the fluctuation of the trading volume decreases after first 
warrant listing. However, since such change in fluctuation does not occur in the 
second warrant listing, we cannot conclude that warrant listing can reduce the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 shows the market-adjusted trading volume (i.e., stock trading volume 
divided by market trading volume) of the sample set during the event window. Similar 
to Figure 2, no significant change is found in the market-adjusted trading volume 
before and after the listing day. Although temporary increase in trading volume from 
Day +4 to Day +6 at the first issue is notified, the trading volume drops to the original 
level once after Day +6. Moreover, such temporary increase does not occur in the 
same period at the second issue. 
TABLE 17 
PARAMETRIC TEST ON TRADING VOLUME OF WARRANT ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
Mean MVR 1.1176 0.9582 
Variance MVR 0.4389 0.0590 
t Statistic 0.5324 (0.5162) 
P(T 1) one-tail 0.3045 0.3098 
t Critical one-tail (95%) 1.8595 1.8595 
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.6089 0.6197 
t Critical two-tail (95%) 2.3060 2.3060 
TABLE 18 
PARAMETRIC TEST ON TRADING VOLUME OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
Mean MVR • 1.1176 0.9582 
. Variance MVR 0.4389 0.0590 
t Statistic 0.7311 
P(T <= t) one-tail 0.2428 
t Critical one-tail (95%) 1.8595 
PCr <二 tytwo-tail 0.4856 
t Critical two-tail (95%) 2.3060 
t 
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Table 17 summarizes the result of parametric test of trading volume when 
comparing with the expected value of 1.0. From this table, we can see that MVKs of 
the two warrant issues are insignificantly different from 1.0 (as both values have only 
40% confident interval). Moreover, Table 18 summarizes the result of parametric test 
of the trading volume when comparing the first issue with the second issue. The 
difference between the first and the second issue is insignificant (with 51% confident 
interval). 
TABLE 19 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON TRADING VOLUME OF WARRANT ISSUES 
First Issue Second Issue 
VRi> 1.0 3 5 
VRi< 1.0 6 4 
Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test Z — -0.1777 Z — -0.2962 
2-tailed P 0.8590 0.7671 
TABLE 20 
NON-PARAMETRIC TEST ON TRADING VOLUME OF MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Result 
VRfirst, i�VRsecond, i 5 
VRfirst, i < VRsecond, i 4 
Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test Z = -0.5331 
‘ 2-tailed P 0.5940 
Table 19 and Table 20 show the results of non-parametric test. This test shows 
similar results to the parametric test. MVRs at the first and the second issue are 
insignificantly different from 1.0. Moreover, when comparing the issues, the difference 
in MVR is also insignificant. 
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Summing up the analysis of trading volume, we find out that covered warrant 
listing has no effect on the trading volume of the underlying stock. Moreover, there is 






DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
From the empirical results, we can see that there is no significant change in 
abnormal return and the trading volume when covered warrants are listed. Moreover, 
there is no difference in these two factors between first and second issues of covered 
warrants. On the other hand, the changes in total volatility and systematic risk due to 
the multiple covered warrant listing are significant. The findings are summarized in 
Table 21. 
TABLE 21 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
First Issue Second Issue 
Abnormal Return no change no change 
Total Volatility decrease no change 
Systematic Risk no change increase 
Trading Volume no change no change 
In this chapter, we will provide some possible reasons for our findings. Due to 
the limitation of our study (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII), our 
reasons may not explain Hilly the real situation but they can show a possible situation 




There is no significant change in abnormal return before and after warrant 
listing in the first and the second issues. There are two possible reasons behind this: 1) 
covered warrant listing has no effect on the return of the underlying stock; and 2) the 
market is informational efficient. 
One characteristic of a covered warrant is that its underlying stock is mostly a 
'blue-chip' stock. This 'blue-chip' stock usually has a large market capitalization (33 
‘blue-chip，stocks in HSI reflects about 70% of total market) and is very liquid. 
Because of high liquidity, the return (or price) responsiveness to any information effect 
is low. So although the abnormal return of the underlying stock drops slightly after 
warrant listing (please refer to Table 5), the 'blue-chip' stock shows low 
responsiveness to this information and so the abnormal return decrease is insignificant. 
On the other hand, market efficiency may cause insignificant change in 
abnormal return. Although empirical studies show that there is positive abnormal 
return at option listing, we should note that the sample periods of these studies are in 
1980s. At that time, the market is not efficient and so the listing effect cannot be fully 
reflected immediately. Thus, these studies can measure significant change in abnormal 
return in a long period of time. However, from late 1980s onward. Hong Kong stock 
market is informational efficient due to technological advance and a lot of 
informational effect can be reflected in stock price within one or two days. Because of 
this, we may not measure the effect of covered warrant listing (if any) since we exclude 
the period from Day -2 to Day +2 during analysis. If the underlying stock price 
reflects the warrant listing effect immediately in this period, we cannot see the effect. 
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To see if there is any abnormal return change in the excluding period, we plot 
the cumulative average abnormal return over the whole event window, including the 
period excluded (Figure 4 in the next page). In this chart, we cannot locate any 
significant change in abnormal return within the previously excluded period. As a 
result, we cannot find any evidence that the abnormal return effect of warrant listing is 
fully reflected within the excluded period. Thus, the finding of insignificant change in 
abnormal return may be due to the reason of no actual effect of covered warrant 
listing. 
Total Volatility and Systematic Risk 
TABLE 22 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN VOLATILITY 
Total Volatility Systematic Risk Unsystematic Risk 
First Issue decrease no change decrease 
Second Issue no change increase decrease 
Table 22 summarizes our findings in volatility. Since the total volatility can be 
divided into systematic risk and unsystematic risk, we can incur the change in 




































































































































































































































































For the first issue, we can see that the total volatility decreases at warrant 
listing. Moreover, the systematic risk does not change in our event window. Such 
findings are consistent with the empirical studies. Since the systematic risk does not 
change, the decrease in total volatility is due to the decrease in unsystematic risk. This 
decrease can be explained by the equilibrium model developed by Detemple and Selden 
(1991) who argue that option or warrant listing will cause risk-lovers shift their 
investments from the underlying stocks to these derivatives. This shift will lead to less 
speculation and thus lower unsystematic risk of the underlying stocks. 
In the second issue, the situation is different. The unsystematic risk continues 
to decrease (due to the increase in systematic risk and unchange in total volatility). By 
issuing more covered warrants on the same underlying stocks, the risk-lovers can have 
more derivative instruments to do their speculations. As a result, more risk-lovers will 
shift to the warrant market because of the multiple listing and thus the unsystematic 
risk continues to drop. 
However, the systematic risk in the second issue moves to the unexpected 
opposite direction. The increase in systematic risk may contradict to the empirical 
studies. This inconsistency may be explained by the features of the covered warrants. 
When a covered warrant is issued, the issuer should hold a certain portion of the 
underlying stock to "cover" or to hedge the warrant issued. The pool size of the 
underlying stock depends on the coverage, or the number of the stock that can be 
purchased by the warrant, of the warrant issued. The more the covered warrants are 
* 
multiply listed, the larger the pool size is (even though this pool is held by different 
issuers). To ensure the hedging to be efficient, the issuers usually use dynamic hedging 
so that they buy or sell the underlying stocks frequently to maintain the hedge ratio. 
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Such trading will affect the volatility of the underlying stock if the pool size is large. 
Because of this, second warrant listing will increase the coverage of the warrant and 
thus the stock pool size. This increase in pool size leads to increase in underlying 
stock trading and also its volatility. 
Besides warrant coverage, the increase in systematic risk in the second listing 
may be caused by speculation. As explained before, second warrant listing can lead to 
increase in speculation of warrants. This will also lead to increase in return volatility of 
warrants. Higher volatility of warrants will also pull up the volatility of the underlying 
stocks since the issuers and some investors should hedge against their portfolios. So 
speculation may lead to increase in systematic risk. 
Trading Volume 
No significant change in trading volume is found at covered warranting in 
multiple issue. In some sense this finding is inconsistent to Detemple and Selden's 
(1991) model. Under this model, underlying stock trading will decrease since the risk-
lovers shifts to warrant market. However, the situation may be somewhat different in 
covered warrant market. As mentioned before, the issuers should cover the warrants 
issued and they usually use dynamic hedging. They hedge their positions by buying 
and selling the underlying stocks frequently so the trading volume will increase. This 




LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Although we have carried out both parametric and non-parametric tests on 
abnormal return, total volatility, systematic risk, and trading volume of the underlying 
stock around multiple covered warrant listing, our analysis has two limitations. These 
two limitations are a tradeoff to each other: sample size and length of the event 
window. 
TABLE 23 
LIST OF COVERED WARRANTS IN 1993 
Issue Strike Subscription Subscription Unit 
Year Issuer Underlying stock Price Price From to Issued Listing 
1993 Robert Fleming Cheung Kong 3 .600 20.50 8-Mar-93 9 - A u g - 9 4 4 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 8 - M a r - 9 3 
1993 Robert Fleming China Light & Power 7 .550 36 .00 22-Mar-93 24-Feb-95 30 ,000 ,000 22-Mar-93 
1993 Peregrine Derivatives H S B C Holdings 1.350 6 3 . 5 0 @ 1 0 22-Mar-93 20-Feb-95 250 ,000 ,000 24-Mar-93 
1993 Barclays de Zoete Hongkong Land 2 .800 14.10 2-Apr-93 24-Feb-95 50 ,000 ,000 2-Apr-93 
1993 Robert Fleming . Hongkong Electric 3 .650 17.30 6-Apr-93 lO-Mar-95 40 ,000 ,000 6-Apr-93 
1993 Peregrine Derivatives Sun Hung Kai 0 .820 36.75(^.10 l-Jun-93 4-May-95 120,000,000 3-Jun-93 
1993 Salomon Inc Dairy Farm 2 .800 12.90 15-Jun-93 24-May-95 25 ,000 ,000 15-Jun-93 
1993 Robert Fleming Hong Kong Telecom 2.600 11.90 21-Jun-93 26-May-95 200 ,000 ,000 21-Jun-93 
1993 Peregrine Derivatives Swire Pacific "A" ^ 0 .940 39.00(«]i0 16-Jun-93 16-May-95 230 ,000 ,000 28-Jun-93 
1993 Credit Lyonnals Hutchison Whampoa 5.130 22.50 7-Jiil-93 25-May-95 30 ,000 ,000 7-Jul-93 
1993 Peregrine Derivatives Jardine Matheson 1.680 6 0 . 0 0 ^ J 0 19-Jul-93 8-Jun-95 200 ,000 ,000 19-Jul-93 
1993 Swiss Bank HSBC Holdings 1.710 81 .50@10 13-Sep-93 lO-Aug-95 120,000,000 9-Sep-93 
1993 Robert Fleming Hopewell Holdings 1.050 5.45 l l -Oct -93 8-Sep-95 250 ,000 ,000 l l -Oct -93 
1993 S.G. Warburg OTC Hysan Development 3 .450 17.00 15-Oct-93 6-Sep-95 20 ,000 ,000 15-Oct-93 
1993 Robert Fleming CITIC Pacific 4 .325 18.80 4-Nov-93 13-Oct-95 80 ,000 ,000 4-Nov-93 
1993 Peregrine Derivatives HSBC Holdings 1.570 7 9 . 5 0 ^ . 1 0 lO-Nov-93 20-Mar-95 100 ,000 ,000 lO-Nov-93 
1993 Salomon Inc Wheelock & Co 3 .300 15.20 lO-Nov-93 18-Oct-95 20 ,000 ,000 lO-Nov-93 
1993 Swiss Bank Henderson Land 0 .800 28 .50间10 2-Dec-93 9-Nov-95 200 ,000 ,000 2-Dec-93 
1993 Swiss Bank Hong Kong Telecom 0.390 14.00@'10 9-Dec-93 18-Nov-95 450 ,000 ,000 9-Dec-93 
1993 Robert Fleming Hong Kong & China Gas 4 .625 21.00 9-Dec-93 16-Nov-95 60 ,000 ,000 9-Dec-93 
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First of all, our sample size is small. We only get nine pairs of covered 
warrants in our sample set. Such small sample size is due to two reasons. The first 
reason is that our period of study is short. Our period of study is from January 1989 to 
December 1992, which can only produce small sample set. Since there are a lot of 
covered warrants issued in 1993 and 1994, we would have a large sample set if we 
extended the period of study. Table 23 shows that there are totally 20 covered 
warrants listed in 1993. However, due to the absence of the stock and market data in 
1993 and 1994, we should exclude the warrants in these two years. 
The second reason relates to the second limitation: short event window. When 
carrying out this type of empirical study, the typical event window size is from 100 to 
300 trading days (or even larger). Such large window size can ensure that some 
temporal effects on price, trading volume, etc., can be reduced. Moreover, analysis on 
large event window can measure the permanent effect due to warrant listing. 
However, since our sample size is small (due to the first reason discussed above), we 
cannot set a large event window so that we can include as many pairs of covered 
warrants as possible. On the other hand, the event window cannot be too small. Small 
event window means that temporal effect may dominate the actual effect due to 
multiple warrant listing. As a result, there is a tradeoff between the size of event 





COMPARISON OF EVENT WINDOW SIZE 
Event Window (63 days) Event Window (41 days) 
Company Issue Listing Date Start Date End Date Start Date End Date 
Hongkong Land 1 13-Aug-9229-Jun-92 29-Sep-92 15- Ju l -92 l l -Sep-92 
Hongkong Land 2 12-Nov-92 28-Sep-92 29-Dec-92 15-Oct-92 l()-Dec-92 
Hopewell Holdings 1 22-Jul-92 4-Jun-92 7-Sep-92 24-Jun-92 19-Aug-92 
Hopewell Holdings 2 l-Oct-92 17-Aiig-92 17-Nov-92 3-Sep-92 3-Oct-92 
Hutchison Whampoa 1 4-Mar-91 15-Jan-91 22-Apr-91 31-Jan-91 3-Apr-91 
Hutchison Whampoa 2 16-May-91 28-Mar-91 3-Jul-91 18-Apr-91 13-Jun-91 
Regal Hotels 1 30-Apr-92 13-Mar-92 17-Jim-92 31-Mar-92 28-May-92 
Regal Hotels 2 1-Jiil-92| 14-May-92 17-Aug-92| l-Jun-92 3Q-Jul-92 
We will illustrate this tradeoff by an example. From Table 24, we can see that 
the above four pairs of covered warrants have overlapping event window if we set the 
size to 63 trading days. If we set the event window size to 41 trading days, these four 
covered warrant pairs can be included in the study. However, 41-day event window is 
too small to carry out analysis. 
By weighting the tradeoff, we decide that the event window size is 63 days so 
that we can get 9 warrant pairs. Due to the short study period and the consideration of 





Our finding in the effect of multiple warrant listing is somewhat similar to the 
empirical studies on options. However, the special characteristics of covered warrant 
also lead to some interesting results which contradict to the past studies. 
First of all, we cannot find any significant change in abnormal return at the 
multiple warrant listing. Moreover, similar to past studies, the systematic risk does not 
change and the total volatility decrease in the first warrant listing. Such decrease in 
volatility can be explained by the equilibrium model developed by Detemple and Selden 
(1991). 
However, some findings are inconsistent to the past studies. The systematic 
risk of the underlying stock increases significantly in second warrant listing. This 
increase can be explained by the coverage requirement of the covered warrant and the 
issuers' hedging activity. 
Finally, no significant change in trading volume is noted. Inconsistent to the 
equilibrium model, we argue that there may be a balance of the shift in risk-lovers and 





In this report, we investigated the effects of covered warrant listing and the 
issue of multiple listing. However, the results that we got are not consistent to that 
from literature review. We find that listing of covered warrants changes the total 
volatility and systematic risk. The inconsistency may arise (i) the local market is 
different in terms of market structure and nature of participants and (ii) the limitation 
of study mentioned in Chapter VII. Irrespective to the limitations that we faced, we 
would make the following suggestions for further studies so as to improve the quality 
of the research project. 
(i) Multiple regression with dummy variables can be used instead of the 
simple regression that we have used. Under our method, listing periods are 
separate into two discrete periods: from Day -32 to Day -2 is the pre-listing 
period and from Day +2 to Day +32 is the post-listing period. Excess returns 
and systematic risk are calculated from simple regression for these two periods. 
‘ The problem is simplified in using multiple regression. One sample of 
formula is suggested below: 
(Ri -Rf) = ai + Pi(Rr„-Rf) + aiki + a2k2 + eit (6) 
where 
Before First Issue Between First and Second Issue After Second Issue 
. ki 二 k2 = 0 "ki = 1 and k2= 0 | ki = 1 and k2= 1 
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ki and k? are dummy variables with values show above. The excess 
returns for first and second issue are the values of ai and 0x2 respectively. The 
method has the advantage of using one regression for the two periods. It 
improves the consistency of the data. Moreover, the limitation of small sample 
size can be eased as the period between the first and second need not be more 
than 65 trading days. Furthermore, the pre-listing period and the post-listing 
period can be studied longer to see whether the impact for warrant issues has 
already been reflected outside our adopted period of 30 trading days. 
Variation of the suggestion can be made to tailor for particular usage. 
In the one that has mentioned, an assumption is embedded - the systematic risk 
does not change over the study period. However the systematic risk of a 
particular stock may be changed because of the issue of covered warrants. A 
term Piks ( R^ - Rf) can be added to see whether significant change is observed 
in the systematic risk. 
(ii) Another alternative of methodology is to use simple regression on the three 
periods i.e. before first listing, between first and second listing and after second 
listing. Variables such as abnormal return, systematic, volatility and market 
adjusted trading volume can be compared to determine any significant changes 
occur in these variables because of warrant listing. Effects of multiple listing 
can be drawn from comparison of those changes observed in the first and 
second issue . 
‘ 
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(iii) The third recommedation is to enlarge the study period to include 1993 
and 1994 which have extensive multiple listing of covered warrants. The 
sampling error is relatively minimized by using a larger sample set. 
(iii) The effect of multiple listing for third, fourth or higher issue can be 
investigated. Since we find that there are some effects on second issue, it is 
interesting to find out whether such change can be continued in the higher 
issuance. In view of the sample size, we would suggest to extend the study to 
include third issue. 
(iv) Two kinds of warrant (equity and derivative warrant) are mentioned in 
Chapter II. Equity warrant is another good choice to investigate the multiple 
listing effect though most of the equity warrants are up to second issue in the 
local market. Altough there exists a large sample number of equity warrants, 
liquidity of these warrants is a problem to investigate any particular effect. It is 
apparent that the trading of equity warrants or its underlying stocks may not be 
active for some months, especially for�mosquito’ stocks. Covered warrants 






LIST OF COVERED WARRANTS ISSUED FROM JAN 1989 TO DEC 1992 
Issue Strike Subscription Subscription Unit 
Year Issuer Underlying stock Price Price From to Issued Listing 
1989 Salomon Inc Hong Kong Telecom L ^ 4.875 lO-Nov-89 1 3 - O c t - 9 2 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1 6 - D e c - 8 9 
1989 Salomon Inc HSBC Holdings 1.320 6.40 20-Oct-89 27-Sep-91 43 ,000 ,000 18-Dec-89 
1990 Salomon Inc Swire Pacific "A" 3.950 15.70 28-Feb-90 25-Jan-93 75 ,000 ,000 l-Mar-90 
1990 CITIC-Telecom Hong Kong Telecom 1.503 4.76 9-Apr-90 lO-Feb-95 669 ,164 ,000 2-Apr-90 
1991 Polycourt Ltd Hutchison Whampoa 2 .500 13.60 4-Mar-91 3-Mar-93 120,000,000 4-Mar-91 
1991 Sponlikle Ltd Cheung Kong 5.000 19.30 26-Apr-91 26-Apr-93 110,000,000 26-Apr-91 
1991 Polycourt Ltd Hutchison Whampoa 3 .800 15.50 16-May-91 15-May-93 153,000,000 16-May-91 
1991 Robert Fleming China Light & Power 4 .650 19.80 26-Jun-91 26-Apr-93 14,235,000 24-May-91 
1991 Robert Fleming Hongkong Electric 2 .800 11.60 lO-Jun-91 lO-May-93 15,000,000 3-Jun-91 
1991 Robert Fleming HSBC Holdings 7 .200 30.50 7-Oct-91 3-Aug-93 25 ,000 ,000 24-Sep-91 
1991 Swiss Bank Hang Seng Bank 7.650 32.50 21-Oct-91 18-Oct-93 15,000,000 21-Oct-91 
1992 Robert Fleming Swire Pacific "A" 6.350 25.40 2-Mar-92 28-Jan-94 35 ,000 ,000 24-Feb-92 
1992 Robert Fleming New World Develop 3 .600 14.10 23-Mar-92 21-Feb-94 35 ,000 ,000 16-Mar-92 
1992 Swiss Bank Bank of East Asia 5.355 21.50 6-Mar-92 4-Mar-94 20 ,000,000 26-Mar-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Cathay Pacific 3 .100 12.60 6-Apr-92 l l -Mar-94 60 ,000,000 30-Mar-92 
1992 Barclays de Zoete HSBC Holdings 1.100 5.20 27-Apr-92 4-Apr-94 60 ,000,000 27-Apr-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Jardine Matheson 1.220 47 .75@10 27-Apr-92 28-Mar-94 250 ,000 ,000 27-Apr-92 
1992 Linkprofit Regal Hotels 0 .300 1.20 30-Apr-92 30-Apr-94 336 ,000 ,000 30-Apr-92 
1992 Salomon Inc Hang Lung 2 .400 9.60 l l -Jun-92 7-Apr-94 30 ,000,000 l l -Jun-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Mandarin Oriental 1.688 6.75 22-Jun-92 18-May-94 50,000,000 22-Jun-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Hutchison Whampoa 4.600 18.40 l-Jul-92 26-May-94 40 ,000,000 25-Jun-92 
1992 Kai-ema Regal Hotels - 1.18 l-Jul-92 30-Apr-94 269 ,017 ,000 l-Jul-92 
1992 Salomon Inc Wharf (Holdings) 4 .400 17.40 9-Jul-92 l l -Jun-94 20 ,000,000 9-Jiil-92 
1992 Smart Best Hopewell Holdings 1.500 5.80 22-M-92 22-Jul-94 400,000,000 22-Jul-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Shun Tak Holdings 1.460 5.85 27-Jul-92 29-Jun-94 75 ,000,000 23-Jul-92 
1992 Robert Fleming Dairy Farm 3.250 13.00 6-Aug-92 6-Jul-94 60,000,000 30-Jul-92 
1992 Barclays de Zoete HSBC Holdings 1.100 45 .50@10 12-ALig-92 17-Jun-94 400 ,000 ,000 12-Aug-92 
1992 Swiss Bank • Jarduie Strategic 7 .050 27.60 22-Jul-92 15-Jul-94 15,000,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Grandtime Henderson Land 0.480 19.10^,10 13-Aug-92 13-Aug-94 180,000,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Best Sharp Hongkong Land 0.370 14.60@10 13-Aug-92 13-Aug-94 150,000,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Salomon Inc Jardine Strategic 7 .150 27.60 13-Aug-92 17-Jul-94 20 ,000 ,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Real Fine Sun Hung Kai � 0 . 8 4 0 33.75(a]10 13-Aug-92 13-Aug-94 135,000,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Sheen Come Wharf (Holdings) 0 .440 17.60阅 10 13-Aug-92 13-Aug-94 135,000,000 13-Aug-92 
1992 Peregrine Derivatives Cathay Pacific 3 .350 13.00 14-Aug-92 14-Aug-94 120,000,000 14-Aug-92 
1992 Golden Jade N e w World Develop 0.420 17.00@10 27-Aug-92 27-Aug-94 135,000,000 27-Aug-92 
1992 Swiss Bank Dairy Farm 3.950 12.40 l-Sep-92 l -Aug-95 20 ,000 ,000 27-Aug-92 
1992 Ford Deluxe HSBC Holdings 1.350 54 .00间 10 24-Sep-92 24-Sep-94 80,000,000 24-Sep-92 
1992 Double Glory Smo Land 1.430 5.70 24-Sep-92 24-Sep-94 37 ,500 ,000 24-Sep-92 
1992 Goodco Investment Hopewell Holdings 1.330 5.30 l-Oct-92 l -Oct-94 40 ,000 ,000 l-Oct-92 
1992 Full Rise Hang Lung 2.400 9.60 8-Oct-92 8-Oct-94 21 ,500,000 8-Oct-92 
1992 Harvest Top HSBC Holdings 1.090 56.50(a]10 15-Oct-92 15-Oct-94 40 ,000 ,000 15-Oct-92 
1992 Oriental Nice Cheung Kong 0 .420 22 .10@10 22-Oct-92 22-Apr-94 120,000,000 22-C)ct-92 
1992 Ease World Jai'dine Matheson 1.420 52 .50@10 29-Oct-92 29-Oct-94 40 ,000,000 29-Oct-92 
1992 Peregrine Derivatives Hysan Development 2.850 13.50 24-Sep-92 24-Mar-94 40 ,000 ,000 5-Nov-92 
1992 Ever Health Cathay Pacific 2.825 11.30 5-Nov-92 5-Nov-94 18,500,000 5-Nov-92 
1992 Bankers Trust China Light & Power 0 .780 31.00(a)10 12-Nov-92 30-Sep-94 100,000,000 12-Nov-92 
1992 Well Concord Hongkong Land 0.280 14.30(^.10 12-Nov-92 12-May-94 240 ,000 ,000 12-Nov-92 





LIST OF COVERED WARRANTS IN THE SAMPLE SET 
Event Window 
Company Issue Listing Date Start Date End Date 
Cathay P a c i f i c 1 30-Mar-92 13-Feb-9215-May-92 
Cathay Pacific 2 14-Aug-92 30-Jun-92 30-Sep-92 
Cheung Kong 1 26-Apr-91 8-Mar-91 ll-Jun-91 
Cheung Kong 2 22-Oct-92 7-Sep-92 7-Dec-92 
China Light & Power 1 24-May-91 10-Apr-91 11 -Jul-91 
China Light & Power 2 12-Nov-92 28-Sep-92 29-Dec-92 
Hang Lung 1 ll-Jun-92 27-Apr-92 29-Jul-92 
Hang Lung 2 8-Oct-92 21-Aug-92 23-Nov-92 
Hong Kong Telecom 1 16-Dec-89 2-Nov-89 6-Feb-90 
Hong Kong Telecom 2 2-Apr-90 15-Feb-90 21-May-90 
HSBC Holdings 1 18-Dec-89 2-Nov-89 7-Feb-90 
HSBC Holdings 2 24-Sep-91 7-Aug-91 8-Nov-91 
Jardine Matheson 1 27-Apr-92 lO-Mar-92 ll-Jun-92 
Jardine Matheson 2 29-Oct-92 14-Sep-92 14-Dec-92 
New World Develop 1 16-Mar-92 27-Jan-92 l-May-92 
New World Develop 2 27-Aug-92 13-Jul-92 14-Oct-92 
Swire Pacific "A" 1 l-Mar-90 12-Jan-90 19-Apr-90 






PRIMARY RESULT OF ABNORMAL RETURN ANALYSIS 
Difference 
First Issue Second Issue (After-Before) 
First Second 
Name Before After Before After Issue Issue 
Cathay Pacific - 0 .0005 -0 .0041 -0.0002 -0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0024 
Cheung Kong 0.0041 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0065 -0.0016 
China Light & Power 0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0047 0.0025 
Hang Lung 0.0027 -0.0033 0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0060 -0.0050 
Hong Kong Telecom 0.0010 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0011 0.0017 
HSBC Holdings 0.0015 0.0001 0.0027 0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0017 
Jardine Matheson 0.0001 0.0053 0.0014 0.0002 0.0053 -0.0011 
New World Develop -0.0015 0.0027 -0.0045 0.0022 0.0041 0.0067 





PRIMARY RESULT OF SYSTEMATIC RISK ANALYSIS 
Difference 
First Issue Second Issue (After - Before) 
First Second 
Name Before After Before After Issue Issue 
Cathay Pacific 1 .0161 .605 ~ 0 . 4 2 3 1 . 0 2 3 0.589 0.600 
Cheung Kong 1.480 1.219 1.125 0.797 -0.261 -0.328 
China Light & Power 0.926 1.283 1.025 1.011 0.357 -0.013 
Hang Lung 1.217 1.491 0.861 1.048 0.274 0.187 
Hong Kong Telecom 0.688 1.364 1.026 0.978 0.675 -0.048 
HSBC Holdings 0.993 0.658 0.830 1.221 -0.335 0.392 
Jardine Matheson 0.973 0.951 0.985 1.278 -0.022 0.293 
New World Develop 1.372 1.095 0.683 1.474 -0.276 0.790 




PRIMARY RESULT OF TOTAL VOLATILITY ANALYSIS 
Difference 
First Issue Second Issue (After - Before) 
First Second 
Name Before After Before After Issue Issue 
Cathay Pacific 1 2 4 . 7 8 3 9 . 7 7 15.30 46.80 -85.00 31.50 
Cheung Kong 213.74 7.44 1.86 5.68 -206.29 3.82 
China Light & Power 31.84 16.89 4.89 8.33 -14.94 3.43 
Hang Lung 64.87 60.44 292.87 21.98 -4.43 -270.89 
Hong Kong Telecom 9.71 56.40 11146.93 17.26 46.68 -11129.66 
HSBC Holdings 6.42 6.70 23.27 19.55 0.28 -3.72 
Jardine Matheson 52.21 46.42 56.71 42.92 -5.79 -13.79 
New World Develop 7533.26 76.63 27.06 35.66 -7456.62 8.59 





PRIMARY RESULT OF TRADING VOLUME ANALYSIS 
First Issue 
NAME TVg TV,a TKn’“‘000) TVm.a COOP) VR 
Cathay P a c i f i c 8 3 , 2 3 5 , 4 0 0 7 3 , 8 6 7 , 0 0 0 20,226,092 27,592,711 0.6505 
Cheung Kong 195,673,093 176,146,541 18,414,228 11,583,291 1.4311 
China Light & Power 71,986,633 54,864,235 13,630,829 12,615,823 0.8235 
Hang Lung 97,035,275 107,436,750 37,881,610 20,681,168 2.0280 
Hong Kong Telecom 58,860,867 99,117,305 10,030,532 7,157,853 2.3597 
HSBC Holdings 333,360,407 188,827,576 10,030,532 7,462,230 0.7614 
Jardine Matheson 21,168,760 27,764,912 21,070,689 38,647,814 0.7151 
New World Develop 121,744,567 110,832,475 16,186,818 23,028,064 0.6399 
Swire Pacific "A" 64,178,881 68,465,706 12,050,205 19,808,697 0.6490 
MVR 二 1.1176 
Second Issue 
NAME TVg TV,a TVm., (WO) TV_(WO) ~ 
Cathay Pacific 104,674,330 83,095,863 17,295,399 12,452,306 1.1026 
Cheung Kong 131,815,700 194,846,239 11,803,375 18,278,857 0.9545 
China Light & Pow . 72,857,483 75,913,469 16,394,030 14,874,021 1.1484 
Hang Lung 63,430,600 105,819,200 11,765,977 19,004,909 1.0328 
Hong Kong Telecom 132,582,870 122,049,447 20,014,352 17,145,674 1.0746 
HSBC Holdings 115,522,178 67,650,312 14,316,755 13,921,535 0.6022 
Jardine Matheson 37,998,419 38,852,301 13,945,001 17,222,626 0.8279 
New World Develop 67,582,656 62,036,284 15,772,055 11,178,733 1.2951 
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